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Abstract: We consider a two-sided, ¯nite-horizon search and matching model with
heterogeneous types and complementarity between types. The quality of the pool of po-
tential partners deteriorates as agents who have found mutually agreeable matches exit
the market. When search is costless and all agents participate in each matching round, the
market performs a sorting function in that high types of agents have multiple chances to
match with their peers. However, this sorting function is lost if agents incur an arbitrarily
small cost in order to participate in each round. With a su±ciently rich type space, the
market unravels as almost all agents rush to participate in the ¯rst round and match and
exit with anyone they meet.
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{ i {1. Introduction
Many entry-level markets for professionals (e.g., academic economists, hospital interns,
and federal law clerks) are organized around annual recruitment cycles. Some markets
use centralized matching procedures, such as the celebrated Gale-Shapley deferred accep-
tance algorithm used to match interns to hospitals in both the U.K. and North America
(e.g., Roth, 1984; Roth and Xing, 1994). In these markets, participants use interviews to
gather information about each other before submitting their preferences to a central clear-
inghouse, which makes all matches according to a pre-speci¯ed algorithm. In contrast,
matches are typically formed sequentially in a decentralized market. For example, in the
North American market for academic economists, information about candidates and aca-
demic positions is gathered from applications, interviews and campus visits, and matches
are made in sequence throughout the recruitment cycle. Matching opportunities change
over time as participants exit the market after successful searches. The non-stationarity
of the search process and its implications for search and matching e±ciency have received
some recent attention from economists interested in comparing centralized and decentral-
ized match-making. For example, in their study of the market for clinical psychologists,
Roth and Xing (1997) describe how market participants sometimes choose to match with
less desirable partners lest the pool of acceptable matching partners dries up quickly. Since
market participants cannot consider more than a few choices simultaneously, the frenzy in
the early stages of the market results in reductions in market scope and sorting e±ciency.1
In a similar vein, Niederle and Roth (2003) use data from the entry-level market for Ameri-
can gastroenterologists to show that after the market was decentralized, gastroenterologists
are more likely to be employed at the same hospital in which they were residents.
The relationship between search and evolving matching opportunities introduces in-
teresting considerations in search dynamics and sorting e±ciency. These considerations
have not been adequately analyzed in the existing theoretical literature, which focuses on
1 A di®erent type of sorting ine±ciency involves mismatches because information about quality of
applicants and about positions is not yet available when participants sign early contracts (Li and Rosen,
1998; Li and Suen, 2000; Suen, 2000). Early contracting occurs in this type of models because it provides
insurance bene¯ts to risk-averse participants.
{ 1 {steady state analysis (Burdett and Coles, 1997; Shimer and Smith, 2000a). One excep-
tion is Jackson and Palfrey (1998), who study how bargaining procedures a®ect the search
outcome in a model where heterogeneous buyers and sellers meet randomly and leave the
market after successful trade. We are instead interested in the search process in the con-
text of matching markets, where participants are heterogeneous and matching e±ciency
arises from complementarity.2 In our stylized model, a job market operates in two rounds.
Applicants di®er in a one-dimensional, continuous quality, called \type," and so do ¯rms.
We assume the match value function exhibits complementarity between worker type and
¯rm type, so that in a frictionless matching environment, the perfect sorting that matches
the highest quality worker to the highest quality ¯rm and so on, maximizes the total match
output. In our matching market, search frictions exist and meetings are random. In the
¯rst round market, participants decide whether or not to form a match upon meeting each
other. If they do, they get their match payo®s and withdraw from the market. Otherwise,
they proceed to the second round, where all remaining agents again meet randomly. Since
this is the last round, they match with whomever they meet. We investigate whether there
will be excessive search and matching in the ¯rst round.
In our benchmark model, there is no participation cost, and all agents participate in
the ¯rst round market. Equilibrium involves a uniform threshold such that an applicant
accepts an o®er from a ¯rm if the latter's type exceeds the threshold, and waits for the
second round otherwise. If all applicants and ¯rms follow this strategy, types lower than
the threshold will not ¯nd a match and will participate in the second round market. The
presence of these low types in the ¯rst round market imposes a negative search externality
on the higher types, so that some of the latter will not be lucky enough to ¯nd an acceptable
match and will also participate in the second round market. In equilibrium the negative
search externality is such that the expected type in the second round market equals the
acceptance threshold. In this equilibrium, the job market performs a \dynamic sorting"
function by giving higher types a better chance to match with their peers and realize their
2 Smith (1995) ¯rst studies an in¯nite-horizon matching model with no entry, where non-steady state
dynamics is driven by temporary matches that are formed because ¯nding acceptable partners takes time
and waiting is costly in terms of foregone production. Shimer and Smith (2000b) examine the possibility
that e±cient search and matching requires non-stationarity.
{ 2 {higher match values. It turns out that the equilibrium level of search externality is optimal
in the sense that the total match value cannot be increased by changing the threshold.
The dynamic sorting function of the job market is robust to alternative modeling
assumptions, including asymmetric type distributions and match value functions, more
than two matching rounds, and discrete types. However, this dynamic sorting unravels if
applicants and ¯rms have to incur a small cost in order to participate in each round of
the market. This is because the negative search externality is crucial to dynamic sorting,
and it is destroyed by the participation cost. To begin, agents of type lower than the
acceptance threshold have no reason to pay the cost to be in the ¯rst round market since
they face zero probability of forming a match. As these types withdraw, the quality of
the ¯rst round pool improves, so higher types now have greater chances of meeting their
peers and they exit the market in greater numbers. As a result, the quality of the second
round pool worsens. But this division into a high quality market in the ¯rst round and a
low quality market in the second round cannot be an equilibrium. The best types in the
low quality second round pool would be acceptable in the ¯rst round, and would therefore
have incentives to join the ¯rst round. As more of the best types from the second round
market join the ¯rst round market, the pool in the second round worsens further, which
lowers the acceptance threshold in the ¯rst round still further. When the participation
cost is arbitrarily small, the market loses its sorting function as almost all agents rush to
participate in the ¯rst round and match with just about anyone they meet. The second
round market collapses. Needless to say, such unraveling outcome is very ine±cient, even
though the participation cost is arbitrarily small.
Our result that almost no sorting can be achieved with an arbitrarily small participa-
tion cost depends on the assumption that types are continuously distributed. When the
type space is discrete, with costless, sequential participation, a di®erent kind of sorting
emerges as equilibrium which does not rely on the negative search externality responsible
for the sorting equilibrium in the continuous type case. For example, when there are two
types on both sides and two rounds of search, it is an equilibrium that high type agents
participate in the ¯rst round and accept only high type agents while low type agents wait
and participate in the second round. Since the two types are segregated, sorting does not
{ 3 {rely on the search externality, and our previous unraveling argument does not apply. In
fact, for small participation costs, there is a mixed strategy equilibrium (in participation
and acceptance decisions) whose outcome is close to the perfect sorting outcome. More
generally, when there are at least as many rounds of matching as the number of types,
almost perfect sorting is an equilibrium outcome for small participation costs. However,
if there are more types than the number of matching rounds, sorting ine±ciency becomes
signi¯cant. For any ¯xed number of matching rounds, as the type space becomes richer,
the types that can be almost perfectly sorted are increasingly concentrated at the bottom
of the type distributions. Our unraveling result obtains again in the sense that almost all
types randomly match and exit in the ¯rst round with no sorting.
2. A Non-stationary Matching Model
To analyze how the search process interacts with matching opportunities over time, we
consider a ¯nite-horizon, two-sided matching market where there is no infusion of new
agents in the relevant horizon. Matching can occur in any of the several matching rounds,
but agents leave the market once they form a match. The distribution of agents changes
endogenously over time. Agents decide whether to search and whether to form a match
based on their expectations about future matching opportunities. The °avor of our main
results can be conveniently conveyed in a model with two rounds. The extension to multiple
matching rounds will be discussed later.
Agents on each side of the market di®er in a one-dimensional productive characteristic,
called \type." Types of agents on the two sides of the market are distributed continuously
and symmetrically on the support [a;b] ½ (0;1), with density function f and distribution
function F. Our results will be extended to asymmetric type distributions later. Through-
out the paper, the two sides of the market are assumed to have the same size. Continuous
type space is a simple representation of matching environments where the number of in-
terview rounds is limited relative to the number of types, because the needs and matching
characteristics of participants are diverse and activities such as application, interviewing,
and decision-making take time. In other markets, relevant information about qualities of
{ 4 {participants may not be so re¯ned due to di±culties in observing match characteristics or
idiosyncrasies in evaluating potential matches. These markets are better represented by a
model with a discrete type space, and the implications will be addressed later.
We assume complementarity between agents' types. In particular, match value to a
type x agent, if matched with a type y agent on the other side of the market, is xy. In
our symmetric model, complementarity implies that the total match value is maximized
by the \perfect sorting," where each type x agent is paired with a type y = x agent on the
other side of the market. All our results extend to the class of more general match value
functions that are multiplicatively or additively separable, and monotone in types. This
class includes, for example, the match value function used by Burdett and Coles (1997).
However, since additively separable match value functions do not exhibit complementarity
between types, how types are matched does not a®ect the total match value and therefore
sorting e±ciency is not an issue.3 Given our focus on the sorting e±ciency in a non-
stationary environment, we need a match value function that exhibits complementarity
and choose xy for simplicity.
We adopt a simple search technology in our model: if the type distribution function is
G, then the probability that any type x agent meets an agent of type y or lower from the
other side of the market is G(y). Later on we modify this random meeting technology to
accommodate di®erent distributions of types and masses of participants on the two sides of
the market. If the market operates for only one round, all types are randomly matched and
there is no sorting. We refer to this outcome as the \random matching," which represents
the opposite extreme of the perfect sorting in our model in terms of total match value.
Our objective is to investigate whether better sorting can be achieved by multiple search
rounds in a non-stationary environment. While more realistic representations of search
frictions have been considered in the literature (Montgomery, 1991; Lagos, 2000; Shimer,
2001), we choose the simple random meeting technology because it makes the evolution
3 In our model all agents are matched with probability 1 and there is no discounting. Without these
assumptions, the total match value may depend on the search and matching decisions even when the match
value function is additively separable. This type of ine±ciency is outside the focus of the present paper.
{ 5 {of the distribution of types analytically more tractable.4 Moreover, the random meeting
technology does not exhibit any scale e®ect, and this allows us to focus on e±ciency gains
that arise solely from better sorting.
A few additional assumptions are in order. First, agents who fail to ¯nd a match at the
end of all matching rounds su®er a large cost, which we normalize by assuming an outside
option value of 0 for all types. Since all matches have strictly positive values, every agent
prefers any match to the outside option. Later we extend our results to situations where
some agents face binding outside options. Next, we assume that agents are risk-neutral, and
do not discount. Adding a discount factor does not change our conclusions qualitatively.
Further, it is reasonable to assume no-discounting in a setup where production takes place
only after the conclusion of the job market regardless of when matches are formed. Finally,
we assume that there are no side payments.5 This assumption is appropriate in matching
markets where wage bargaining plays a minor role in match formation (e.g., dating and
marriage, tenure track academic positions, and federal law clerks).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3 we consider the case
of no participation cost, and demonstrate gains in sorting e±ciency achieved by dynamic
sorting in multiple search rounds. Section 4 shows that an arbitrary small participation
cost causes unraveling of dynamic sorting and reduces it to the random matching. In
Section 5 we investigate how the unraveling result depends on the richness of the type
space. Section 6 concludes the paper with a brief summary and some ¯nal remarks.
3. Full Participation and Dynamic Sorting
Since an unmatched agent gets a payo® of 0, agents accept anyone they meet in the second
(and last) round of the market. Anticipating this, an agent of type x agrees to match with
4 In the search and matching literature, random meeting technology is sometimes referred to as \linear,"
as opposed to \quadratic" (e.g. Smith, 1995). With a quadratic search technology, the matching payo®
of any agent is una®ected by the matching decision of agents with whom he is not willing to match. This
rules out negative search externality that is crucial for our results.
5 It is straightforward to de¯ne full participation equilibria with side payments under some bargaining
rule, say Nash bargaining. With speci¯c assumptions on the type distribution (uniform) and the match
value function (symmetric power functions), we are able to show that if complementarity between types
is strong enough, costless search leads to dynamic sorting and unraveling occurs with costly participation.
Whether these results are general is subject of future research.
{ 6 {y in the ¯rst round if and only if xy ¸ xm, where m is the symmetric expected type in
the second round. This implies a uniform acceptance threshold m for all types of agents.
Note that types lower than m are rejected by all types in the ¯rst round. Nevertheless,
since participation is free, these low types have no reason to skip the ¯rst round search.
Indeed, any robustness criterion that allows for a small chance that agents make mistakes
in acceptance decisions would ensure full participation in the ¯rst round market.
Given any ¯rst round acceptance threshold k, the expected type m in the second
round market is determined by the distribution of types that remain unmatched after the
¯rst round. Since two agents match and leave the market only when each agent's type is
greater than k, the relative size of the second round market is R(k) = 1 ¡ (1 ¡ F(k))2.





where G(x;k) is the distribution of types in the second round, given by
G(x;k)R(k) =
(
F(x); if x · k;
F(k) + (F(x) ¡ F(k))F(k); if x > k.




We can verify that G(x;k) stochastically dominates G(x;k0) if k > k0. It follows that
m0(k) > 0 for any k 2 (a;b).
Definition 3.1. A threshold type ke is a full participation equilibrium if ke = m(ke).
An equilibrium in our model occurs when the expected type m(k) that results from an
acceptance threshold k precisely justi¯es k. The above reference to full participation is to
distinguish the equilibrium de¯ned here from later de¯nitions of equilibrium when search
is costly and participation is endogenous. Our ¯rst result characterizes the existence and
uniqueness of an equilibrium with an interior threshold ke.
Proposition 3.2. (i) A full participation equilibrium ke 2 (a;b) exists; and (ii) it is
unique if the type distribution F(x) is log-concave.


























xf(x) dx > a:
Since m(k) is a continuous function, by the Intermediate Value Theorem, an equilibrium
ke 2 (a;b) exists.
(ii) Write m(k) as:
m(k) = w(k)q(k) + (1 ¡ w(k))Q(k); (3:2)
where q(k) = E[x j x < k], Q(k) = E[x j x ¸ k], and w(k) = F(k)=R(k). Take derivative
of equation (3.2), we get
m0(k) = w(k)q0(k) + (1 ¡ w(k))Q0(k) + w0(k)(q(k) ¡ Q(k)):
If F is log-concave, then q0(k) < 1 and Q0(k) < 1 (An, 1998). Further, q(k) < Q(k) and
w0(k) > 0. Thus, m0(k) < 1, implying a unique equilibrium. Q.E.D.
It is evident from the above proof that the existence of an equilibrium with an interior
threshold ke does not depend on the de¯nition of m(a). On the other hand, our de¯nition
of m(a) (equation 3.1) rules out k = a as an equilibrium. Letting m(a) = a makes k = a
an equilibrium according to De¯nition 3.1, but it would not be robust. For example,
if agents who are indi®erent between accepting their match and waiting for the second
round \tremble" with an arbitrarily small probability and reject their match, the second
round mean would be strictly greater than a, making it non-optimal to accept type a.
The uniqueness of equilibrium depends on a characterization of the slope of m(k). Since
m0(k) > 0, in general expectations about the prospects in the second round market can
be self-ful¯lling and multiple equilibria may occur.6 Proposition 3.2 uses a log-concavity
6 The issue of multiple equilibria is certainly interesting, but is orthogonal to the purpose of the present
paper. Li and Suen (2004) deal with the issue of multiple equilibria in an early contracting model based
on the trade-o® between insurance bene¯ts and sorting ine±ciency.
{ 8 {condition on the type distribution to rule out multiple equilibria.7
In an equilibrium with an interior ¯rst round threshold ke, the market performs a
sorting function by giving types higher than ke a better chance to match with their peers
and realize their higher match values. How large is the e±ciency gain from dynamic
sorting relative to the random matching? For a numerical example, consider the uniform
type distribution F on [1;2], which is log-concave. The unique equilibrium is given by
ke = 1:38, with a total match value of V ¤ = 2:272, compared to a total match value
of V 0 = 2:25 under the random matching. The percentage gain from dynamic sorting
seems small, less than 1%, but it would be signi¯cantly greater if either the support of
the types is wider ([1;10] instead of [1;2]), or the match value function exhibits stronger
complementarity (x2y2 instead of xy). To isolate the sorting gains from any e®ect that
may arise from rescaling the types, we need a more accurate measure. In our present
example with uniform type distribution on [1;2] and match value function xy, the total
match value from the perfect sorting is only V 1 = 2:333. This suggests that we measure
the e±ciency gain by (V ¤ ¡ V 0)=(V 1 ¡ V 0), which implies a relative gain of 26.5% from
dynamic sorting.
Dynamic sorting through selective ¯rst round acceptance is imperfect due to the kind
of search frictions we have imposed. An interesting question is whether it can be improved
without changing the search technology. We ask: are agents in the market too selective, or
do they rush to match in the ¯rst round? To answer this question, consider the problem
of choosing a threshold type k to maximize the total match value
V (k) = (1 ¡ R(k))Q2(k) + R(k)m2(k):
The next result shows that the sorting e±ciency of dynamic sorting cannot be improved.
Proposition 3.3. If k¤ maximizes the total match value, then k¤ is a full participation
equilibrium.
7 Unlike in Burdett and Coles (1997), in our model log-concavity is not required for the existence of a
non-stationary equilibrium, and is instead used to ensure uniqueness of equilibrium. In fact, log-concavity
of the function
R x
a F(t) dt su±ces to guarantee uniqueness of equilibrium. We use a stronger condition,
namely log-concavity of F(x), in order to simplify the proof.
{ 9 {Proof. The derivative V 0(k) of V (k) with respect to k is given by
2(1 ¡ R(k))Q(k)Q0(k) + 2R(k)m(k)m0(k) ¡ R0(k)(Q(k) ¡ m(k))(m(k) + Q(k)): (3:3)
Note that for all values of k, m(k) and Q(k) also satisfy the relationship,
(1 ¡ R(k))Q(k) + R(k)m(k) = mu;
where mu is the unconditional mean of the distribution F of types. Di®erentiating the
above identity with respect to k, we have
(1 ¡ R(k))Q0(k) + R(k)m0(k) ¡ R0(k)(Q(k) ¡ m(k)) = 0:
Substituting the above into equation (3.3), with a few steps of manipulations we get
V 0(k) = 2(Q(k) ¡ m(k))f(k)(1 ¡ F(k))(m(k) ¡ k):
Since V 0(a) > 0 and V 0(b) < 0, the optimal threshold k¤ is interior and satis¯es V 0(k¤) = 0.
Thus, m(k¤) = k¤ and k¤ is an equilibrium threshold. Q.E.D.
Equation (3.3) in the proof of Proposition 3.3 shows that raising the ¯rst round ac-
ceptance threshold k has two opposite e®ects on the total match value. On one hand, since
Q0(k) > 0 and m0(k) > 0, an increase in the acceptance threshold from its equilibrium
value improves the quality of matches realized in both the ¯rst round and the second round.
This suggests that agents may not be selective enough in their choice of matching partners
in the ¯rst round. On the other hand, since R0(k) > 0, raising the ¯rst round acceptance
threshold increases the size of the second round market, which has a lower match quality.
Proposition 3.3 establishes that there is an equilibrium in which these two e®ects exactly
cancel each other, so that the total match value is maximized.
We do not intend Proposition 3.3 as a statement regarding constrained e±ciency of
the dynamic sorting outcome. To de¯ne constrained e±ciency, one would need to be more
rigorous about the restrictions on the search technology, and on the participation and
acceptance decisions faced by a hypothetical social planner. It would seem reasonable to
{ 10 {maintain the assumption of random pairwise meeting for the planner, but even with this
restriction on the search technology, the planner can improve sorting e±ciency by limiting
participation of low types or by adopting a type-dependent acceptance rule in the ¯rst
round. Jackson and Palfrey (1998) characterize constrained e±ciency in a non-stationary,
two-sided random matching environment with heterogeneous agents, but with a match
value function arising from the buyer-seller bargaining problem.8 While their techniques
can be used to address the issue of constrained e±ciency in our model, we will not pursue
this line because our focus is on comparing sorting e±ciency under costless and costly
search. Before introducing costly search and endogenous participation, in the remainder
of this section we provide separate extensions of our dynamic sorting result to asymmetric
type distributions and multiple matching rounds. These extensions further illustrate the
intuition of how dynamic sorting improves upon the random matching, but they are not
critical for understanding our unraveling arguments in Sections 4 and 5.
Asymmetric type distributions. Now we relax our strong symmetry assumptions that
the two sides of the market have the same type distribution and that the match value
function takes the symmetric product form. Suppose the match value function is xy but
the two sides, X and Y , have di®erent type distributions, FX and FY , on [aX;bX] and
[aY ;bY ] respectively. Note that there is no loss of generality in assuming the match value
function xy, as any multiplicatively separable match value function (with constant-sign
cross derivatives) can be converted into xy if we rede¯ne the types. In this asymmetric
search model, an equilibrium is given by two acceptance thresholds kX and kY , such that
in the ¯rst round market kX is the marginal type of X-agents that Y -agents are willing
to accept, and kY is the marginal type of Y -agents that X-agents are willing to accept.
In equilibrium matches are formed in the ¯rst round market when types x ¸ kX and
y ¸ kY meet with each other, with kX equal to the expected type mX of X-agents in the
second round and kY equal to the expected type mY of Y -agents. As mX and mY are
functions of both kX and kY , an equilibrium corresponds to a ¯xed point (kX;kY ) in the
8 Jackson and Palfrey (1998) focus on a two-period model. Palfrey (1997) extends their characterization
of constrained e±ciency to an arbitrary sequence of periods.
{ 11 {mapping of mX and mY . With the values of mX and mY at kX = aX or kY = aY de¯ned
in the same way as in (3.1), the mapping of mX and mY is continuous, implying the
existence of an equilibrium by Brouwer's ¯xed point theorem. The following proposition
shows that if a pair of acceptance thresholds maximizes the total match value, then it
forms an equilibrium. The proof is similar to that of Proposition 3.3 and is relegated to
the Appendix.
Proposition 3.4. If (k¤
X;k¤
Y ) maximizes the total match value in the asymmetric model,
then (k¤
X;k¤
Y ) is a full participation equilibrium.
Multiple matching rounds. To provide a general de¯nition of equilibrium with T
matching rounds, let Gt be the symmetric type distribution in round t and kt be the
acceptance threshold type for each t = 1;:::;T. In the ¯rst round of the market, G1 is
just F, the initial type distribution.
Definition 3.5. A sequence of threshold types k1;k2;:::;kT = a and a sequence of type
distributions G1 = F;G2;:::;GT, are an equilibrium if (i) for any t = 1;2;:::;T ¡ 1,
Gt+1(x)Rt+1(kt) =
(
Gt(x); if x · kt;
Gt(kt) + (Gt(x) ¡ Gt(kt))Gt(kt); if x > kt;
(3:4)
where Rt+1(kt) = 1 ¡ (1 ¡ Gt(kt))2 is the relative size of the round t + 1 market with
respect to the round t market; and (ii) for any t = 1;:::;T ¡ 1,




According to the above de¯nition, in each round t, only types higher than kt have a
positive probability of being matched.9 Further, the second equilibrium condition implies
9 An induction argument can be used to establish that equilibrium matching is determined as if accep-
tance thresholds are uniform in each round. To see this, consider the case of T = 3. We already know that
in round 2 there is a uniform acceptance threshold, say k2, which equals the expected type in round 3. In
round 1, the acceptance threshold for types below k2 is k2, as they will not match in round 2. For types
above k2, the acceptance threshold, say k1, is higher than k2 because they have a positive probability of
matching with types above k2 in round 2. Thus, even though there are two di®erent acceptance thresholds
in round 1, only types above k1 have a positive probability of being matched.
{ 12 {that kt > kt+1 for each t. Any equilibrium involves a decreasing sequence of accep-
tance thresholds k1;:::;kT, so that agents in equilibrium become increasingly less picky
as matching proceeds over time, and correspondingly, the sequence of type distributions
is ordered by stochastic dominance: Gt ¯rst order stochastically dominates Gt+1 for each
t = 1;:::;T ¡ 1. Finally, De¯nition 3.5 assumes that the market does not end before the
¯nal round T. The justi¯cation for this follows the same logic as Proposition 3.2. If the
market were to end in round t < T ¡ 1, with kt = a, then for any type distribution Gt at
the beginning of round t, the expected match type from waiting for another round would
be given by (1=2)a + (1=2)
R b
a xGt(x) dx, which is greater than a. Thus, agents who were
accepting types marginally higher than a in round t market were not making the optimal
decision, implying that the market cannot end in round t.
Proposition 3.6. (i) An equilibrium in the T-round model exists with k1 < b; and (ii)
equilibrium is unique if the initial distribution of types F is log-concave.
The proof of Proposition 3.6 is rather involved and is relegated to the Appendix. The
main technical di±culty lies in the fact that the matching decisions are determined by a
backward induction through equation (3.5), while the evolution of matching opportunities
is determined by a forward induction through equation (3.4). We overcome this di±culty
by introducing an algorithm that iterates back and forth between equations (3.4) and (3.5)
and reducing the equilibrium relations to a two-round problem.
For any sequence of acceptance thresholds k1;:::;kT¡1, the expected total match










where R1(k0) = 1, and where the sequence of type distributions G1 = F;G2;:::;GT satisfy
equation (3.4). Imagine that a sequence of acceptance thresholds k1;:::;kT is chosen to
maximize the expected total match value. If the optimal sequence is a decreasing sequence,
then it is an equilibrium in the T-round matching model. The proof is in the Appendix.
Proposition 3.7. There is an equilibrium sequence of thresholds, k1;:::;kT, that maxi-
mizes the expected total match value among all decreasing sequences.
{ 13 {With more rounds of matching, dynamic sorting becomes signi¯cantly more e±cient.
In our previous example of uniform type distribution on [1;2], with three rounds of match-
ing, the unique equilibrium acceptance thresholds are k1 = 1:48 and k2 = 1:32. The
resulting total match value is V ¤¤ = 2:284. According to the e±ciency measure introduced
earlier, in this example a matching market with three rounds achieves the e±ciency level of
(V ¤¤ ¡V 0)=(V 1 ¡V 0), which represents 40.7% of the available e±ciency gain, compared
to the e±ciency gain of 26.5% with two rounds of matching.
4. Endogenous Participation and Unraveling
In the model of the previous section, agents do not choose to search. They appear in the
¯rst round market even if they have no chance of forming a match. This is innocuous if
there is no cost of participating in the market. But by appearing in the market without any
prospect of getting matched, agents of lower types impose a negative search externality on
others who intend to match. Ironically, such negative externality turns out to be necessary
for the market to perform the sorting function. High type agents who happen to meet a
low type agent in the ¯rst round have to try their luck again in the second round market,
so the externality imposed by low type agents helps preserve the quality of the pool in
the second round market. In this section, we show that the externality is destroyed by
a participation cost, and as a result, matching opportunities in the second round market
deteriorate, leading to a collapse of the second round market.
The intuition of the unraveling argument in this section can be readily grasped when
the match value function is additively separable. For example, suppose that the match
value is x+y to both a type x agent and a type y agent who decide to match, and imagine
that each round of search costs c to an agent. Then, if the expected type in the second
round market is m, a type y agent is acceptable to any type x agent in the ¯rst round if
and only if y ¸ m ¡ c. Types lower than m ¡ c will not participate in the ¯rst round for
any positive participation cost, since they would never be accepted. As no unacceptable
types participate in the ¯rst round, there is no search externality, and all participating
types will ¯nd an agreeable partner and exit the market after the ¯rst round. It follows
{ 14 {that if all types above some threshold l participate in the ¯rst round market, the average
participating type in the ¯rst round market is Q(l) while the expected type m in the second
round market is q(l). But this kind of sorting cannot work for any l > a: we already know
that l cannot be lower than m¡c; l cannot be equal to m¡c either, because otherwise it
would not be true that m equals q(l); if instead l > m ¡ c, then types just below l would
be acceptable to all types in the ¯rst round market and would strictly prefer to enter.
A more rigorous argument can be used to establish an unraveling result: with any pos-
itive participation cost, in equilibrium all types participate and are randomly matched in
the ¯rst round market. However, this unraveling has no implications to matching e±ciency,
because any matching outcome yields the same total match value when the match value
function is additively separable. In contrast, unraveling can have important e®ects when
the match value function exhibits complementarity between types. This section establishes
a similar unraveling result with the match value function xy: when c is arbitrarily close to
zero, the equilibrium outcome becomes arbitrarily close to the random matching. A small
participation cost thus dramatically reduces the sorting e±ciency achieved by dynamic
sorting. The argument is more complicated than in the case of x + y, because we need to
prove that participation decisions are characterized by a threshold, and more importantly,
acceptance decisions are no longer type-independent. Non-uniform acceptance decisions
imply that some sorting is possible with a signi¯cant participation cost c. However, when c
becomes arbitrarily small, acceptance decisions become almost uniform and the model be-
haves similarly as in the case of an additive separable match value function. An argument
similar to the heuristic argument above then leads to the unraveling result.
For ease of exposition, we make two simplifying assumptions: the participation cost c
is type-independent, and c < a2. The second assumption ensures that even the lowest type
agent will participate in the matching market at least once. Later in this section we show
how both assumptions can be relaxed. Now we ¯rst consider participation decisions in the
¯rst round. The following lemma shows that the payo® gain from participating in the ¯rst
round market satis¯es a single-crossing property, and therefore participation decisions are
characterized by a threshold.
{ 15 {Lemma 4.1. There exists a threshold l 2 [a;b] such that types higher than l participate
in the ¯rst round market, and types lower than l wait for the second round market.
Proof. In the ¯rst round market, conditional on participation, a match between type x
and type y is mutually agreeable if and only if xy ¸ xm ¡ c and xy ¸ ym ¡ c. Consider
the participation decision in the ¯rst round by an agent of type x. It is optimal for type
x agent to participate in the ¯rst round market if
E[p(x;y)xy + (1 ¡ p(x;y))(xm ¡ c)] ¡ c ¸ xm ¡ c;
where the expectation is taken with respect to the distribution of y types that participate
in the ¯rst round market, and p(x;y) is the probability that agents of types x and y form
a match. The above inequality can be written as:
E[p(x;y)y + (1 ¡ p(x;y))(m ¡ c=x)] ¸ m: (4:1)
Any type x0 > x agent can follow the same acceptance strategy of type x, and can guarantee
that p(x0;y) = p(x;y) for any y by rejecting any type y that is willing to accept type x0
but not type x. Since m ¡ c=x is increasing in x, the above strategy implies that it is
optimal for type x0 to participate.10 Q.E.D.
An agent who rejects a match in the ¯rst search round will incur the participation
cost again in the second round. Since agents of higher types have relatively more to gain
from ¯nding a good match, they are more willing to incur the cost c. Unlike the model
of Section 3, therefore, acceptance thresholds di®er across participating types in the ¯rst
round market. Fix an expected type m 2 [a;b] of the second round. For each type x, let




10 We adopt the convention that an agent chooses participation when he is indi®erent between par-
ticipation and waiting. Otherwise, it is possible to construct equilibria with non-threshold participation
decisions. In any such equilibrium, all ¯rst round participants are accepted with probability 1, and the
expected participating type in the two rounds is the same, and hence equal to mu. The expected total












When v(x) lies between a and b, it is the highest type that is willing to accept type x. Note
that (i) u(x) is increasing and concave, and v(x) is increasing and convex; (ii) there are at
most two intersections of u(x) and v(x); and (iii) u(x) = x = v(x) at any intersection x. If
the threshold for participation in the ¯rst round market is l, a match between participating
types x and y is mutually acceptable if and only if
minfv(x);bg ¸ y ¸ maxfu(x);lg: (4:2)
Figure 1 shows the functions u(x) and v(x) when there is an intersection of u and v
in [a;b]£[a;b]. Also shown is a square box [l;b]£[l;b] which represents the pool of agents
participating in the ¯rst round market, with l above the intersection. Random encounters
that fall in the shaded region result in matches in the ¯rst round. The pool of agents in the
second round market consists of all types below l, as well as types above l whose random
encounter in the ¯rst round does not satisfy the matching rule (4.2). For ¯xed m and l,




F(x); if x · l;
F(l) +
R x
l (1 ¡ F(minfv(x);bg) + F(maxfu(x);lg) ¡ F(l))
dF(x)
1¡F(l); if x > l
(4:3)
{ 17 {where R(m;l) is the size of the market in the second round, given by





(1 ¡ F(minfv(x);bg) + F(maxfu(x);lg) ¡ F(l)) dF(x):
The second round expected type resulting from m and l is then given by
R b
a x dG(x;m;l).
Note that the de¯nition of G(x;m;l) (equation 4.3) remains valid when u and v do not
intersect in [a;b] £ [a;b].
For other values of m and l, we can use (4.2) to de¯ne the resulting second round
mean similarly. The only exception occurs when l = a and m · a + c=b. In this case, the
monotonicity of u implies that u(x) < a for any x 2 [a;b]. All types accept each other and
exit in the ¯rst round, and hence R(m;a) = 0. As in equation (3.1), we use continuity
to de¯ne the resulting second round expected type in this case as liml!a
R b
a x dG(x;m;l).
Since m < l + c=b for any l > a, all participating types accept each other and exit in the
¯rst round. We have R(m;l) = F(l), and
G(x;m;l)F(l) =
(
F(x); if x · l;
F(l); if x > l,
(4:4)
implying that for any m · a + c=b,
Z b
a
x dG(x;m;a) = lim
l!a
q(l) = a: (4:5)
Definition 4.2. An endogenous participation equilibrium is a participation threshold
le 2 [a;b] and an expected type me 2 [a;b] for the second round market, such that (i)
given me, any type x ¸ le prefers participating in the ¯rst round market and any type
x < le prefers waiting for the second round market; and (ii) me =
R b
a x dG(x;me;le).
We ¯rst construct an equilibrium that will play a prominent role in the discussions
below. In such an equilibrium, le = a and me = a, hence the second round market ceases
to operate as all agents rush to form matches in the ¯rst round with anyone they happen
to meet. This unraveling outcome is the same as the random matching.
Proposition 4.3. For any participation cost c such that 0 < c < a2, le = a and me = a
is an endogenous participation equilibrium.
{ 18 {Proof. Condition (i) of De¯nition 4.2 is satis¯ed by l = a and m = a. If m = a, then
u(b) < a. By the monotonicity of u, we have u(x) < a and u(a) < x for any x 2 [a;b].
Then, if l = a, type a is accepted with probability 1 and gets a payo® of mu, which is
strictly greater than m = a. By Lemma 4.1, all types strictly prefer participation in the
¯rst round. Condition (ii) of De¯nition 4.2 is satis¯ed, because le = a and me = a · a+c=b
imply that
R b
a x dG(x;a;a) = a by (4.5). Q.E.D.
The construction of the unraveling outcome as an endogenous participation equilib-
rium relies on our de¯nition that the second round mean is a for m and l such that
R(m;l) = 0 (equation 4.5). Note that at l = a and any m < a + c=b, any other de¯nition
would make the map from given m and l to the second round expected type discontin-
uous. This implies that as long as c > 0, the construction of the unraveling equilibrium
in Proposition 4.3 is justi¯ed by continuity and is therefore robust to small perturbations
to participation or acceptance decisions. On the other hand, at l = a and m = a + c=b,
the map from m and l to the second round expected type cannot be made continuous
under any de¯nition of the expected type, because liml!a
R b
a x dG(x;a+c=b;l) = a, while
limm#a+c=b
R b
a x dG(x;m;a) > a (because for any m > a + c=b, but small enough so that
u(b) < v(a), the remaining types in the second round consist of an equal mass of types in
[a;u(b)] and in [v(a);b].) As a result, when c = 0 we cannot resort to continuity to justify
any de¯nition of the second round mean when l = a and m = a. Hence whether or not un-
raveling is an endogenous participation equilibrium outcome when the participation cost is
0 is entirely a matter of de¯nition.11 Further, as suggested in Section 3, when participation
is costless, the notion of endogenous participation equilibria is not compelling.
The unraveling equilibrium of le = a and me = a is the only equilibrium with the
property that all participants in the ¯rst round market are accepted with probability 1.
In fact, condition (ii) of De¯nition 4.2 is satis¯ed for any l when m = q(l), because this
11 According to our de¯nition (4.5), le = a and me = a is an endogenous participation equilibrium when
c = 0. But the conclusion is reversed if, as in equation (3.1), we compute the second round expected type
by taking the limit as m converges to a while ¯xing l at a. Whether or not unraveling is an endogenous
participation equilibrium when c = 0 does not a®ect our conclusion in Proposition 4.4 that it is the only
limit equilibrium as c converges to 0.
{ 19 {implies l ¸ q(l) > u(b) and so all ¯rst round participants match and exit with probability
1, making the second round expected type equal to q(l). However, as we will show formally
in the proof of the next proposition, if l > a then any type just below l would have strict
incentives to participate in the ¯rst round market. Thus, m = q(l) cannot be part of any
equilibrium because it does not satisfy condition (i) of De¯nition 4.2.
Proposition 4.3 establishes unraveling as an equilibrium outcome, but it does not rule
out the possibility that some sorting occurs in other equilibria. Of particular interest
is whether there are equilibria that approach the level of sorting e±ciency achieved by
dynamic sorting when the participation cost becomes arbitrarily small. The following
result states that the answer is no. Unraveling is the only limit equilibrium when the
participation cost is arbitrarily small. That is, any equilibrium with small c must be close
to the unraveling outcome with no sorting.
Proposition 4.4. As participation cost c converges to 0, le = a and me = a is the only
limit endogenous participation equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose that there is an equilibrium other than le = a and me = a regardless
of how small c is. Then, there is a sequence of c converging to 0 such that an equilibrium
lc and mc di®erent from the unraveling equilibrium exists for each c. First, we argue that
each equilibrium lc and mc satis¯es lc < u(b), or mc > lc +c=b. This property means that
the threshold type lc is accepted with probability strictly less than 1. Suppose instead
mc · lc + c=b. From the monotonicity of u, we have u(x) < y and u(y) < x for all
x;y 2 [l;b], so that all participating types accept each other and exit with probability 1.
The type distribution in the second round is then given by (4.4), implying mc = q(lc).
Now, if lc > a, then any type x between q(lc) and lc would be accepted with probability
1 in the ¯rst round as u(b) = mc ¡ c=b = q(lc) ¡ c=b < x. Such type x would strictly
prefer to join the ¯rst round of search since they expect a partner of average type Q(lc),
compared to an average type mc = q(lc) if they wait for the second round. Therefore,
lc = a, and hence mc = q(a) = a, contradicting the assumption that the equilibrium lc
and mc is di®erent from the unraveling equilibrium.
Next, type lc must also be accepted with a strictly positive probability, so we have
c=b < mc¡lc < c=lc. Thus, mc¡lc converges to 0 as c converges to 0. It then follows that
{ 20 {u(b) ¡ lc ! 0. Further, in any equilibrium we have v(lc) > mc; otherwise type lc would
strictly prefer not to participate since the highest type v(lc) that would accept lc is lower
than the expected type in the second round. This implies that lc is greater than the larger
intersection of u and v if they intersect (because v(x) = x = u(x) < mc at any intersection
x). Hence the second round type distribution G(x;mc;lc) is given by (4.3). Since u(b) ¡
lc ! 0, which is equivalent to v(lc) ¡ b ! 0, we have 1 ¡ F(minfv(lc);bg) ! 0 and
F(maxfu(b);lcg)¡F(lc) ! 0. As u and v are increasing functions, 1¡F(minfv(x);bg) ! 0
and F(maxfu(x);lcg)¡F(lc) ! 0 for every x > lc. Thus G(x;mc;lc) converges pointwise
to the distribution function given by (4.4). Thus, mc ¡q(lc) ! 0, which is consistent with
mc ¡ lc ! 0 only if lc ! a and mc ! a. Q.E.D.
We illustrate Proposition 4.4 with the earlier example of uniform type distribution on
[1;2]. In this example, besides the unraveling equilibrium with le = 1 and me = 1, which
exists for any cost c < 1, there is a sequence of equilibria converging to the unraveling
equilibrium. In these endogenous participation equilibria, some sorting takes place because
relative to the random matching, high types have a higher probability of matching with
each other as some of the low types do not participate in the ¯rst round. For example,
when c = 0:04, we have lc = 1:05 and mc = 1:08, with a corresponding total match
value of V = 2:262, compared to V 0 = 2:25 with no sorting. According to the measure
introduced earlier, the sorting e±ciency gain is (V ¡V 0)=(V 1¡V 0) = 14:35%. Note that
in this example, we have mc ¡ c=lc < lc < mc ¡ c=b so that type lc is accepted by some
but not all participants in the ¯rst round. See Figure 1 for an illustration. In fact, the
presence of su±ciently many ¯rst round participants that are accepted with probability
less than 1 is critical for sorting to occur in an endogenous participation equilibrium. These
agents, who are unacceptable to the highest types, create the search externality needed to
maintain the average quality of the second round pool. Without this search externality, the
second round mean m would be close to the average quality of the non-participants, which
would motivate more types to participate in the ¯rst round and reduce the level of sorting.
Moreover, unlike in dynamic sorting of Section 3 where search externality is guaranteed
by the assumption of full participation, it is more delicate to ensure the search externality
{ 21 {with costly and endogenous participation, because the ¯rst round participants must be at
the same time accepted with a strictly positive probability. Indeed, the 14.35% e±ciency
gain is the maximum that can be achieved in an endogenous participation equilibrium,
compared to 26.5% achieved in dynamic sorting. When c becomes small, it becomes
increasingly di±cult to create the search externality in equilibrium, as the u(x) function
becomes almost horizontal while the v(x) function becomes almost vertical. This means
that for any expected type m in the second round, ¯rst round participating types have
almost identical acceptance thresholds, and the set of types that are acceptable to some
but not all agents shrinks to the empty set in the limit when c converges to 0.
In the remainder of this section, we show that our unraveling result is robust to
alternative assumptions of type-dependent participation costs, binding outside options,
asymmetric type distributions, and multiple matching rounds. These robustness checks
further illustrate how endogenous participation destroys the negative search externality
and causes the market to unravel. Readers who are more interested in how our unraveling
result depends on the richness of the type space can continue directly to Section 5.
Type-dependent participation costs. We have so far assumed that the participation
cost c is uniform. Although there is no presumption as to whether and how the cost
should change with type, it is important to check if the unraveling result is robust. To do
so, suppose that the participation cost of type x on either side of the market is given by a
continuous function cµ(x), where c is a positive parameter. As c converges to 0, the whole
cost function becomes arbitrarily small. We claim that if µ(x)=x is a decreasing function
for x 2 [a;b], then our earlier analysis of unraveling goes through in the same way, and
all results remain valid. To see this, note that because µ(x)=x decreases with x, from
equation (4.1) we have that participation in the ¯rst round market by a lower type implies
participation by a higher type. Lemma 4.1 still holds, and any equilibrium is associated
with a threshold l of participation.12 The mutual acceptance region is now de¯ned by the
12 If the match value function is not xy but some other separable function, the condition that is su±cient
to imply Lemma 4.1 will change. For example, if the match value function is wX(x)wY (y), then the
corresponding condition is that µ(x)=wX(x) decreases with x and µ(y)=wY (y) decreases with y. Lemma
4.1 cannot be obtained in the same way if the match value function is not separable.
{ 22 {following two functions:








Since µ(x)=x decreases with x, both u(x) and v(x) remain increasing. Equilibrium can
then be de¯ned as in De¯nition 4.2. As c converges to 0, u(x) becomes horizontal and v(x)
becomes vertical in Figure 1, as what happens when µ(x) is constant. This is su±cient to
imply that the only limit equilibrium is l = a and m = a as c converges to 0.
Binding outside options. In making our main unraveling argument, we have assumed
that c < a2, so that in the second round all remaining agents participate. This assumption
is innocuous when agents' outside option of remaining unmatched is low relative to poten-
tial match values, as we are primarily interested in what happens when the participation
cost is small. To reconsider our unraveling result when the outside option value is relatively
high, assume that a = 0. Then, for any positive participation cost, however small, there
will be agents that never participate. This implies that for any second round expected
participating type m, in the ¯rst round the waiting payo® to a type x is maxfxm ¡ c;0g,
instead of xm. This does not a®ect Lemma 4.1, and so the ¯rst round participation deci-
sions are still governed by a threshold rule. But now given any participation threshold l,
expected type m, and the resulting second round type distribution G(x;m;l), the second
round participation decisions are also determined by a threshold. An equilibrium pair of
¯rst round participation threshold le and second round mean me can be de¯ned in the
same way as in De¯nition 4.2, with the second condition replaced by: (ii0) given le, me
and the resulting G(x;me;le), either the second round expected type me uniquely satis¯es




or if no such value exists, implying that no remaining agent participates in the second
round, we have me = 0. Let Á be the unique solution to the equation ÁQ(Á) = c. In
words, type Á is the threshold type if the market operates for only one round. Note that Á
is an increasing function of c. Corresponding to Proposition 4.3, the unraveling outcome
here is l = Á and m = 0. This follows from arguments analogous to Proposition 4.3; in
{ 23 {particular, for any m < Á + c=b, the participation threshold that satis¯es condition (i) in
De¯nition 4.2 is Á. Finally, we can show that the counterpart of Proposition 4.4 holds:
l = Á and m = 0 is the only limit equilibrium as c converges to 0. Since Á converges to 0
as c converges 0, we have the same unraveling outcome for the case of a = 0.
Asymmetric type distributions. When the two sides of the market X and Y have
di®erent type distributions, to de¯ne an equilibrium, we need two pairs of ¯rst round
participation thresholds and second round expected types, one for each side of the market.
Let the four variables be lX, mX, lY and mY . Given mX and mY , the lowest type that
x is willing to accept in the ¯rst round is u(x) = mY ¡ c=x, and the highest type that is
willing to accept x is v(x) = c=(mX ¡ x). The roles of u and v are reversed for Y -agents.
The mutual acceptance region is completely described by the two functions u and v. The
two functions are no longer symmetric around the main diagonal in the [aX;bX]£[aY ;bY ]
diagram, but the crucial property is retained that u and v become almost horizontal and
vertical respectively when c becomes arbitrarily small. The assumption of di®erent type
distributions also calls for an extension of our search technology, because in general the
size of participants can di®er for the two sides of the ¯rst round market. In particular, the
probability of ¯nding a match cannot be 1 for all participants on the long side (the side
with more participants). In any natural extension, agents on the short side of the market
¯nd a match with probability 1. With this restriction, the unraveling result of Proposition
4.4 can be derived in a similar way. We sketch the argument as follows. The critical step




Y converge to 0 in any sequence of equilibria indexed































incurring the cost in the ¯rst round without having any chance of being accepted. Next,





X · 0; otherwise, for su±ciently small cost, types just below l
ci
X would strictly prefer
participating because they would ¯nd a match with probability 1 and would be acceptable




X = 0. Together with the fact that the second round
type distribution converges to the conditional distribution below lX, we have limci!0 l
ci
X =
{ 24 {aX and limci!0 m
ci
X = aX. Since all type x agents participate in the ¯rst round market
and since they are on the short side of the market, we also have limci!0 l
ci
Y = aY and
limci!0 m
ci
Y = aY .13 Since the above holds for all convergent subsequences of equilibria, the
only possible limit equilibrium is the unraveling outcome, with lX and mX both converging
to aX, and lY and mY converging to aY .
Multiple matching rounds. Consider how our unraveling result is a®ected when there
are more than two matching rounds. The improvement in sorting e±ciency a®orded by
multiple matching rounds described in Section 3 does not extend to the case with endoge-
nous participation. A simple induction argument makes this point clear. In round T ¡ 1,
our two-round unraveling result in Proposition 4.4 applies: for c converging to 0, in the only
limit equilibrium all remaining agents participate in round T ¡ 1 and accept anyone they
meet. But then in round T ¡ 2, agents should anticipate that the market will e®ectively
close in the next round if c is arbitrarily small. So round T ¡2 is just like the next-to-last
round. Our two-round unraveling result again applies, and so on. Thus, for any ¯nite T,
the only limit equilibrium with T matching rounds when the participation cost per round
converges to 0 is that the market operates only for the ¯rst round in which all agents
participate and accept whomever they meet. Thus, when agents choose when to search,
adding more matching rounds only serves to hasten the date of search and contracting for
all market participants, with no increase in matching e±ciency.
5. Sorting and Unraveling with a Discrete Type Space
So far we have assumed that there is a continuum of types in a ¯nite-horizon matching
model. This modeling choice allows us to produce clean insights about how dynamic
sorting improves matching e±ciency and how it depends critically on the search externality.
Implicit in our choice of a continuum of types is the assumption that the type space is
in¯nitely richer than the potential matching opportunities a®orded by a ¯nite number
13 Recall that we have assumed that the two sides of the market have the same size at the outset. If
the two sides have di®erent sizes, then the unraveling result holds for the short side of the market. The
long side will unravel to the point that all acceptable agents participate in the ¯rst round market.
{ 25 {of rounds. Do our conclusions about dynamic sorting and unraveling apply to matching
markets with a ¯nite number of types?
First consider a symmetric, costless participation model with two rounds of matching
and N types, where N ¸ 2 is a positive integer. Let the types be x1 > x2 > ::: > xN.
Each type xi, i = 1;:::;N, consists of a continuum of agents, and has a fraction fi > 0
in the population. The match value to a type xi agent, if matched with a type xj agent
from the other side, is xixj. As in Section 3, there is a common acceptance threshold in
the ¯rst round market: if m is the expected match type in the second round market, each
type accepts a potential match xi if xi ¸ m. Given the ¯rst round threshold type xk (the
highest type accepted), the second round type distribution is given by
giR =
(
fi if i > k;
fi P
j>k fj if i · k




is the relative size of the second round market, and gi is
the fraction of xi types agents in the second round market population. The expected
type in the second round is then m =
PN
i=1 gixi.14 A full participation equilibrium can
be characterized by a threshold type xk such that xk+1 < m · xk. Existence of a full
participation equilibrium can be easily established, and we can extend the analysis to the
case of more than two rounds as in Section 3. In general, multiple equilibria exist, and
some equilibria may involve a probability between 0 and 1 of each type rejecting xk. In
any of these equilibria, the negative search externality that low types impose on high types
allows the market to perform a dynamic sorting function.
Before considering how costly search a®ects the sorting function of the market, it is
important to note that when the type space is discrete, there are equilibria with sorting that
do not rely on the negative search externality. In these equilibria, types choose to enter the
market sequentially even though participation is costless.15 For example, when there are N
14 As in equation (3.1), we can de¯ne the expected type in an \empty" second round market, to be the
limit of the second round expected type as the probability that each type rejects xN converges to 0.
15 In the continuous type case of Section 3, there may exist equilibria where not all types participate
in the ¯rst round market. For example, with two matching rounds, one such equilibrium is de¯ned by
a participation threshold l and an acceptance threshold k > l, such that the expected type m in the
{ 26 {types and T ¸ N matching rounds, it is an equilibrium that for each i = 1;:::;N, type xi
skips the ¯rst i¡1 rounds, and in each round j, j ¸ i, type xi participates and accepts type
xj and above. The equilibrium outcome is the perfect sorting for N types. As suggested
in Section 3, these perfect sorting equilibria are di±cult to justify when participation
is costless. However, because these equilibria do not rely on the search externality, our
unraveling argument in Section 4 does not apply. In this section, we establish that when
there are at least as many matching rounds as there are types, the perfect sorting can
be approximated arbitrarily closely by sequential participation as the participation cost
converges to zero. This ¯nding contrasts our unraveling result in Section 4: the sorting
function provided by sequential participation does not disappear as the participation cost
becomes small. However, the size of the e±ciency gain a®orded by sequential participation
crucially depends on the richness of the types space. We will show that, consistent with
our analysis in the continuous type case of Section 4, for any ¯xed number of rounds, as
the number of types becomes large, no equilibrium can achieve a level of sorting e±ciency
that is signi¯cantly higher than the unraveling outcome.
We now consider a general symmetric model of N ¸ 2 types and T ¸ 2 rounds
by backward induction. The cost of participation is c; we assume that
p
c < xN. In
round T ¡ 1, let gi
T¡1, i = 1;:::;N, be the type distribution of remaining agents. Unlike
in the continuous type case, participation and acceptance decisions can be probabilistic;
indeed, we will construct mixed-strategy equilibria so that the type distribution gT¡1 is
non-degenerate. Let xlT¡1 be the lowest type that participates in round T ¡1 with positive
probability, and let ¼T¡1 > 0 be the participation probability. From an argument identical
to that in Lemma 4.1, we know that types above xlT¡1 participate with probability 1.
Next, let xvT¡1 be the lowest type that rejects type xlT¡1 with positive probability, and let
°T¡1 > 0 be the rejection probability. Types above xvT¡1 reject type xlT¡1 with probability
1. Given lT¡1 and ¼T¡1, the probability that any participating type meets type xlT¡1 in
second round is exactly k. Unlike the endogenous participation equilibria with sequential sorting that we
construct below, these equilibria rely on the negative search externality and disappear when participation
is costly.




































T¡1 (1¡°T¡1) be the total accep-
tance probability for the threshold type xlT¡1 conditional on participation. Given lT¡1,
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is the relative size of the round T market. In writing the above expressions, we have
implicitly assumed that type xlT¡1¡1 and above are accepted with probability 1 by all
participating types. In other words, the threshold type xlT¡1 is the only participating type
that faces a positive rejection probability. This must hold when c is su±ciently small. To
see this, note that for type xlT¡1 to be acceptable to some types but not to all, we need
xlT¡1 to be close to mT, the round T expected type, when c becomes su±ciently small.
Then, we have xlT¡1¡1 > mT ¡ c=x1 when c small enough, and so all types above xlT¡1
are accepted with probability 1. We modify De¯nition 4.2 to have the following:
Definition 5.1. Given a round T ¡ 1 type distribution gT¡1, a continuation equilibrium
in round T ¡ 1 is lT¡1, ¼T¡1, vT¡1, °T¡1 and mT such that (i) type xlT¡1 is the lowest
type that weakly prefers to participate in round T ¡1 market; (ii) type xvT¡1 is the lowest






{ 28 {The above de¯nition can be applied recursively to de¯ne an endogenous participation
equilibrium. When T = 2, we have an endogenous participation equilibrium by setting
gi
T¡1 = fi.16 As in the continuous type case, there is an equilibrium corresponding to
the unraveling outcome: lT¡1 = N with ¼T¡1 = 1, and vT¡1 = 1 with °T¡1 = 0. In
this equilibrium, all types participate and accept each other with probability 1. Unlike the
continuous type case, however, even when c is arbitrarily small, there exist other equilibria.
In particular, consider lT¡1 = N and vT¡1 = N ¡ 1. If type xN agents are accepted by
type xN¡1 with positive probability, then they can be indi®erent between participating
and not participating if the cost c is small enough and xN¡1 > mT. Type xN¡1 can be
indi®erent between accepting and rejecting type xN, because a round T mean mT greater
than xN due to the rejection of xN compensates the cost of participating again in the
matching. The intuition of this construction is veri¯ed in the lemma below. Moreover, in
this equilibrium, as the participation cost c converges to 0, the participation probability
¼T¡1 for type xN converges to 0 and the rejection probability °T¡1 for type xN¡1 converges
to 1. If there are only two types (N = 2), then such equilibrium outcome would be the
perfect sorting in the limit.
Lemma 5.2. Given a round T¡1 type distribution gT¡1, for c su±ciently small, a continua-
tion equilibrium in round T¡1 exists with lT¡1 = N, vT¡1 = N¡1 and ¼T¡1;°T¡1 2 (0;1).
Further, as c converges to 0, limc!0 ¼T¡1 = 0, and limc!0 °T¡1 = 1.
The proof of the above lemma is in the Appendix. As long as T ¸ N, we can
apply the construction of the continuation equilibria in Lemma 5.2 recursively to obtain
an equilibrium through sequential participation, which converges to the perfect sorting as
c converges to 0.
Proposition 5.3. Suppose that T ¸ N. There exists a sequence of endogenous partici-
pation equilibria such that the equilibrium matching converges to the perfect sorting as c
converges to 0.
16 For T > 2, recursive application of De¯nition 5.1 requires an implicit assumption that the participa-
tion decisions in each round are governed by a threshold rule. This assumption is satis¯ed by construction
in equilibria with sequential sorting and bottom sorting that we develop below, and is not required in the
proof of Proposition 5.5.
{ 29 {Proof. We prove the proposition by construction. Fix any su±ciently small c, and
consider the following form of strategies. The market closes in round N, when all remaining
agents participate and accept each other. In each active round before the market closes,
types participate in sequence: type x1 agents start full participation from round 1 and are
always accepted; for each t = 2;:::;N, type xt agents skip the ¯rst t ¡ 2 rounds, where
they would be rejected with probability 1, participate with a small probability in round
t ¡ 1, where they are rejected with a high probability, and fully participate from round t
onwards and are thereafter always accepted.
When c becomes arbitrarily close to 0, each active round t, t = 1;:::;N, becomes
an exclusive matching place for xt, and the matching converges to the perfect sorting. It
remains to show that there exist strategies of the form described above that constitute an
endogenous participation equilibrium for any su±ciently small c. We do this by induction.
Without loss of generality, assume T = N, and set lT = N with ¼T = 1, and vT = 1 with
°T = 0. By Lemma 5.2, we only need to show that (i) for su±ciently small c, there exists
a round t continuation equilibrium with lt = t + 1 and vt = t and ¼t;°t 2 (0;1), where
the expected payo®s in round t + 1 are given by the round t + 1 continuation equilibrium
with lt+1 = t + 2 and vt+1 = t + 1 and ¼t+1;°t+1 2 (0;1); and (ii) as c converges to 0,
limc!0 ¼t = 0 and limc!0 °t = 1. To establish this step, we note that when c becomes
su±ciently small, by induction types below xlt play no role in determining the expected
payo®s of type xlt and above. The round t continuation equilibrium can be identi¯ed in
the same way as the round T ¡ 1 continuation equilibrium in Lemma 5.2. Q.E.D.
If the number of matching rounds T is smaller than the number of types N, then the
endogenous participation equilibria constructed in the above proof, which we will refer to
as \sequential sorting," cannot approximate the perfect sorting. Matching ine±ciency then
arises. The important question is: how great is the ine±ciency when T < N? An upper
bound of the ine±ciency can be obtained in the following way. For su±ciently small c, an
equilibrium with \bottom sorting" exists which looks just like sequential sorting, except
that the types that fully participate from round 1 onwards are type xN¡T+1 and above,
instead of the single highest type x1 in sequential sorting. When c converges to 0, the
{ 30 {bottom types (xN¡T+2 through xN) are almost perfectly sorted through sequential partic-
ipation, while all higher types (xN¡T+1 through x1) are randomly matched to each other
and exit in the ¯rst round. Unlike the full participation equilibria with dynamic sorting
that exist when there is no participation cost, the endogenous participation equilibria with
bottom sorting do not unravel when c becomes arbitrarily small. However, as N becomes
larger for ¯xed T, bottom sorting becomes more ine±cient, because the fraction of types
that are randomly matched in round 1 becomes larger. Although there may exist other
equilibria more e±cient than bottom sorting, we show that as N becomes arbitrarily large
and c arbitrarily small for ¯xed T, there is almost no sorting in any of these equilibria.
As in the proof of Proposition 4.4, a necessary condition for any continuation equilib-
rium in round T ¡ 1 with lT¡1 < N is that mT > xlT¡1. Otherwise, type xlT¡1 would be
accepted with probability 1 by all participating types and would strictly prefer to partic-
ipate. This implies that mT · xlT¡1+1 since all higher types would participate in round
T ¡ 1 and exit. But then type xlT¡1+1 would be accepted by higher types with probabil-
ity 1 in round T ¡ 1 and would therefore strictly prefer participation, contradicting the
assumption that type xlT¡1 is the participation threshold. The lemma below provides a
necessary condition for mT > xlT¡1. The proof is in the Appendix.
Lemma 5.4. Given a round T ¡ 1 type distribution gT¡1, for c su±ciently small, for
any lT¡1 < N, a necessary condition for a continuation equilibrium with participation


















The left-hand-side of the inequality (5.1) is the largest probability of meeting the
threshold type xlT¡1 in round T ¡ 1, computed under the assumption that ¼T¡1 = 1.
This probability represents the greatest possible negative search externality imposed on
the participants in round T ¡ 1, as only the threshold type is rejected with a positive
probability. The inequality thus requires that the search externality imposed by the single
threshold type be su±ciently large, so that enough higher types remain unmatched after
round T ¡1 to keep mT above xlT¡1. Note that (5.1) is automatically satis¯ed if lT¡1 = N
{ 31 {(as the right-hand-side is zero): if the threshold type is the lowest type xN then mT is
greater than xN for arbitrarily small search externality. This explains why the continuation
equilibrium with lT¡1 = N (bottom sorting) always exists.
The intuition behind Lemma 5.4 is key to understanding the next proposition. For
any ¯xed T, as N becomes arbitrarily large and c arbitrarily small, the search externality
that can be imposed by any single threshold type becomes negligible. Thus, no equilibrium
sorting can di®er signi¯cantly from bottom sorting, which in turn becomes closer to the
unraveling outcome in terms of matching ine±ciency. For the following proposition, we
consider sequences of type distributions as more types are added. Let fN be the type
distribution with N di®erent types, and denote FN(x) =
P
i:xi·x fi
N. We assume that (i)
the support of each fN is contained in [a;b] ½ (0;1); (ii) liminfN!1 FN(x) > 0 for any
x > a; and (iii) limN!1 supi fi
N = 0. These assumption ensure that the type distribution
becomes atomless and a is a limit point when N is arbitrarily large.17
Proposition 5.5. For any ¯xed T, in any endogenous participation equilibrium, the
¯rst round participation threshold converges to a as N becomes arbitrarily large and c
arbitrarily small.
The proof of the proposition is in the Appendix. We use the following discretized
version of our previous example in Sections 3 and 4 to illustrate Proposition 5.5. There
are N types evenly spaced between 1 and 2, with xj = 1 + (N ¡ j)=(N ¡ 1) for each
j = 1;:::;N, and the type distribution is uniform, with fj = 1=N. Suppose that T = 2 and
c = 0. For each N we compute both the full participation equilibrium with dynamic sorting
that achieves the highest level of e±ciency according to the measure introduced in Section
3, and the most e±cient endogenous participation equilibrium. The e±ciency measure
corresponding to the dynamic sorting outcome varies little as N increases, centering around
27%. For the best-performing endogenous participation equilibria, the e±ciency measure
starts at 100% when N = 2 (the perfect sorting), but it drops to below 27% when N = 60,
and approaches zero as N increases further. For example, if N = 101, the threshold type in
17 If a is not a limit point then the following proposition applies to the smallest limit point as N
becomes arbitrarily large.
{ 32 {dynamic sorting is xk = 1:39, with a total match value of V d = 2:273, implying an e±ciency
measure of (V d ¡ V 0)=(V 101 ¡ V 0) = 27:05%, where V 0 = 2:25 for the random matching
and V 101 = 2:335 for the perfect sorting with 101 types. In contrast, for the endogenous
participation equilibrium, the participation threshold type xl is 1.09 (l1 = 91, v1 = 90,
¼1 = 0 and °1 = 1), with a total match value of V b = 2:27, and an e±ciency measure
of 24.12%. When the number of types is so numerous that an atomless continuous type
model is a close approximate, the conclusion of Section 4 applies, and almost no sorting
takes place in any endogenous participation equilibrium. With more matching rounds,
e±ciency improves notably in dynamic sorting, while the improvement is slower under
endogenous participation. For example, if T = 3 and N = 101, the participation threshold
types in the most e±cient dynamic sorting equilibrium are 1.49 in round 1 and 1.33 in
round 2, with an e±ciency measure of 41.18%. The gain over two rounds of matching is
obtained through substantially more selective acceptance decisions in the ¯rst round. In
contrast, the participation threshold types in the endogenous participation equilibrium are
1.12 and 1.03, with an e±ciency measure of 31.36%. Participation thresholds change only
marginally compared to two rounds of matching. There is limited e±ciency gain over two
rounds of matching, because sorting occurs only at the bottom of the type distribution.
6. Conclusion
Economists have long recognized that in a matching market both matching decisions and
search decisions involve externalities and can cause market ine±ciency. The existing litera-
ture (Diamond 1982; Mortensen 1982; Hosios 1990) has focused on the search externalities
by assuming homogeneity on the two sides of the market. The research on the search ex-
ternalities culminates in the so-called Hosios (1990) condition for search e±ciency, which
requires an agent's bargaining power to equal the elasticity of the matching function. A re-
cent paper by Shimer and Smith (2001) examines the implications of search and matching
externalities in a model with heterogeneous agents. The Hosios condition does not hold
in the model of Shimer and Smith: in the decentralized market attractive types search
too little and match too readily, while unattractive types search too much and match too
{ 33 {infrequently. In a di®erent setup with posted prices and directed search, Shi (2002) ¯nds
e±ciency with heterogeneous agents.
The papers on search and matching ine±ciencies mentioned above focus on steady-
state stationary analysis, which greatly reduces the distributional complexity of search
and matching dynamics. Our model is motivated by the concern that the steady state
need not be the relevant model in many entry level markets for professional workers. We
posit that the dynamics in this kind of markets are better captured by a ¯nite-horizon
model with no replacement of the types that have formed matches and left the market.
Two di®erent sorting mechanisms emerge from our analysis of a non-stationary dynamic
matching environment, dynamic sorting and sequential sorting. In the former, agents can
a®ord to be selective in early rounds of matching, because the negative search externality
imposed by the presence of low types maintains su±ciently high quality in later rounds.
This search externality makes it impossible for types to sort perfectly, but is necessary for
dynamic sorting to function. When a small participation cost is introduced, lower types
are forced to skip initial matching rounds, making them exclusive markets for higher types.
But these exclusive markets tend to unravel, as the highest types in the later markets have
incentives to switch to early markets. In contrast, sequential sorting operates by creating
exclusive markets through sequential participation. Lower types skip initial rounds because
they would be rejected by higher types in early rounds. Each exclusive market must be
homogeneous, for otherwise they would be unraveled. Since sequential sorting does not rely
on search externality, sorting is perfect when there are enough many rounds to create one
exclusive market for each type, and it is robust to the introduction of a small participation
cost. However, when there are not enough many rounds, only the types at the bottom
of the distribution can be sorted. Sorting becomes increasingly ine±cient, and eventually
indistinguishable from the unraveling outcome.
The endogenous evolution of trading opportunities poses di±cult problems for equi-
librium analysis. Characterizing trading opportunities in matching markets is complicated
because agents are heterogeneous and sorting is important. We are able to make some
progress by ruling out side payments and restricting the search technology and the match
value function. Relaxing these assumptions in a tractable way remains a challenge.
{ 34 {Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.4. For any pair of thresholds kX and kY , let
R(kX;kY ) = 1 ¡ (1 ¡ FX(kX))(1 ¡ FY (kY ))
be the size of second round market. De¯ne QX(kX) = E[x j x ¸ kX] and QY (kY ) =
E[y j y ¸ kY ]. Let mX(kX;kY ) be the mean of X-agents in the second round market,
and de¯ne mY (kX;kY ) similarly. An equilibrium is characterized by ke
X and ke
Y such that
kX = mX(kX;kY ) and kY = mY (kX;kY ). Consider the problem of choosing kX and kY
to maximize the total match value V (kX;kY ), given by
(1 ¡ R(kX;kY ))QX(kX)QY (kY ) + R(kX;kY )mX(kX;kY )mY (kX;kY ):
For notational convenience, we drop the variable k in the functions. Taking derivatives,
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Since (1 ¡ R)QX + RmX = mu
X for any kX, where mu










Y is the unconditional mean of y, we have (1¡R)QY +RmY = mu








We follow similar steps as those in the proof of Proposition 3.3 to show that @V=@kX = 0
if mX = kX. Similarly, @V=@kY = 0 at any equilibrium threshold ke
Y . Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3.6. For the following proof of Propositions 3.6 and 3.7, it is
convenient to write ~ Gt(x) =
R x
a Gt(z) dz, St(x) = 1 ¡ Gt(x), and ~ St(x) =
R b
x St(z) dz for
any t. Also, for each round t, threshold kt and type distribution Gt, let




{ 35 {so that the second equilibrium condition can be written as kt¡1 = m(kt;Gt). Whenever
confusion does not arise, we write mt instead of m(kt;Gt).
(i) The existence of equilibrium can be shown with an induction argument. We know
from Proposition 3.2 that for any initial type distribution G an equilibrium exists when
T = 2. Suppose that an equilibrium exists in a model with T ¸ 2 rounds, and let
k1(T;G) be the largest equilibrium threshold in the ¯rst round market with the initial
type distribution G. Then, consider the following algorithm for ¯nding an equilibrium
with T + 1 rounds of the market in total and the initial type distribution F: start with a
¯rst round threshold type k1 2 (k1(2;F);b); set the type distribution G1 in the ¯rst round
market to F; use G1 and k1 to compute the type distribution G2 in round 2 according to
the ¯rst equilibrium condition (3.4); use k1 and G2 to determine a round 2 threshold k2
from the second equilibrium condition (3.5). If k2 = k1(T;G2), then an equilibrium has
been found by combining this particular k1 with the sequence of T thresholds that starts
with the resulting k2, with the resulting G2 as the initial type distribution.
The above process is well-de¯ned, because for each k1 and F, the type distribution G2
in the second round is uniquely de¯ned according to (3.4). Further, (3.5) uniquely de¯nes








(k2 ¡ x) dG2(x):
Using integration by parts and equation (3.4) for G2, that noting that k2 · k1, we can
further rewrite the above as ~ F(k2) = ~ F(k1) ¡ F(k1)~ S(k1). Since k1(2;F) is the largest
equilibrium threshold in the ¯rst round market with T = 2 and the initial type distribution
F, we have ~ F(k1) ¸ F(k1)~ S(k1) for any k1 ¸ k1(2;F), with equality if and only if k1 =
k1(2;F). Thus, the ¯rst equilibrium condition uniquely de¯nes k2 for any k1 ¸ k1(2;F).
Now, from De¯nition 3.1 (or equivalently De¯nition 3.5) we know that k2 = a when
k1 = k1(2;F), so k2 < k1(T;G2) if we start the process with k1 = k1(2;F). On the other
hand, from (3.5) we have k2 = b when k1 = b, so k2 > k1(T;G2) if we start with k1 = b.
Continuity of k2 and k1(T;G2) in k1 then implies that the algorithm yields at least one
k1 2 (k1(T;G2);b) such that k2 = k1(T;G2), which identi¯es an equilibrium with T + 1
rounds from the induction assumption.
{ 36 {(ii) To prove the uniqueness of the equilibrium, consider the following algorithm for ¯nding
an equilibrium with T rounds of the market in total and the initial type distribution F:
start with a ¯rst round threshold type k1; use the initial distribution G1 = F to compute
the type distribution G2 in round 2 from the ¯rst equilibrium condition (3.4); use k1 and
G2 to determine a round 2 threshold k2 from the second equilibrium condition (3.5); use k2
and G2 to ¯nd G3; repeat this process for all t = 3;:::;T ¡1, until we ¯nd kT¡1 and GT.
(It can be shown by an induction argument that this algorithm is well-de¯ned.) Since the
algorithm de¯nes a sequence of decreasing thresholds, we have gt(x)=Gt(x) = f(x)=F(x)
for all x · kt¡1 and for each t = 2;:::;T ¡ 1, and is therefore a decreasing function due
to log-concavity of F. If kT¡1 =
R b
a x dGT(x), we have found an equilibrium.
To show that there is a unique equilibrium, we need to compute the derivatives with
respect to k1. Recognizing that k1 determines both the sequence of thresholds kt and
the sequence of distributions Gt, we use the following iterative method. For each t =
1;:::;T ¡ 2, using integration by parts, we can rewrite (3.5) as follows:
~ Gt(kt+1) = ~ Gt(kt) ¡ Gt(kt)~ St(kt):
Since the algorithm determines a decreasing sequence of thresholds, the above becomes:
~ F(kt+1) = ~ F(kt) ¡ F(kt)~ St(kt): (A:1)




F(k1)(1 + S(k1)) ¡ f(k1)~ S(k1)
F(k2)
:
Note that dk2=dk1 > 1 if F(k2) < F(k1)¡f(k1)~ S(k1). For t = 2;:::;T ¡1, we use another
way of rewriting the second equilibrium condition for round t ¡ 1, again with integration
by parts, to get
kt¡1 = kt + ~ St(kt): (A:2)
Combining (A.1) and (A.2), we have for t = 2;:::;T ¡ 1
~ F(kt+1) = ~ F(kt) ¡ F(kt)(kt¡1 ¡ kt):
{ 37 {The above equation can be used to compute each dkt=dk1 recursively, starting from











An equilibrium is de¯ned by kT¡1 =
R b
a x dGT(x), or equivalently,




The above can be viewed as an equation in k1. Since F is log-concave, ~ F=F is increasing,
and it follows that a unique ¯xed-point in k1 exists if dkT¡1=dk1 > dkT¡2=dk1. Thus,
Gt(kt+1) < Gt(kt)¡gt(kt)~ St(kt) if for any each t = 1;:::;T¡2, then we obtain dkt+1=dk1 >
dkt=dk1 recursively, starting from dk2=dk1 > 1, and therefore the equilibrium is unique.
It remains to argue that for any distribution G, any thresholds k > k0, such that
k > k1(2;G), k0 is determined by ~ G(k0) = ~ G(k) ¡ G(k)~ S(k) and g(x)=G(x) is decreasing
for any x < k, we have
G(k0) < G(k) ¡ g(k)~ S(k): (A:3)
This condition is su±cient, because even though changes in k1 a®ect all distributions Gt,
the stated condition applies to all G, k and k0 that are linked through the equilibrium
conditions and is therefore stronger than Gt(kt+1) < Gt(kt) ¡ gt(kt)~ St(kt) for any each
t = 1;:::;T ¡ 1. To see why (A.3) is true, note that since g(x)=G(x) is decreasing in x,
we have g(x) > G(x)
g(k)
G(k) for any x < k. Integrating from k0 to k (note that k0 < k by
assumption) gives




Since ~ G(k0) = ~ G(k) ¡ G(k)~ S(k), we have (A.3), as desired. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3.7. The e±ciency of an equilibrium can be established with
an induction argument. Fix a market with a total of T rounds and the initial distribution
F. For any sequence of decreasing thresholds k1;:::;kT¡1, let Gt, t = 2;:::;T, be de¯ned
{ 38 {according to equation (3.4), starting from G1 = F. Let VT be the expected total match














which, by integration by parts, can be more conveniently written as
Vt =
³
ktSt(kt) + ~ St(kt)
´2
+ Rt+1(kt)Vt+1:
The objective is then to maximize V1.
We restrict attention to decreasing sequence of thresholds. Our induction argument
starts with the observation from Proposition 3.3 that for the two-round case, any optimal
threshold satis¯es equation (3.5). Now, assume that this holds for any T ¡1 rounds, so that
for each t = 2;:::;T ¡1, any sequence of decreasing thresholds that maximizes Vt satis¯es
the equilibrium condition that kt¡1 = mt. Then, for a sequence of thresholds k1;:::;kT¡1
to maximize V1, it is necessary that kt¡1 = mt for all t ¸ 3, and that @V1=@k1, evaluated
at k1;:::;kT¡1, is equal to 0. We will show that these necessary conditions imply that
k1 = m2, which establishes the proposition by induction.
To show k1 = m2, we recursively derive the expressions of V1 and @V1=@k1, both
evaluated at the optimal sequence of thresholds k1;:::;kT¡1. To start, from the induction
assumption that kT¡1 = mT, we have VT = k2








Taking derivatives with respect to k1, and evaluating at kT¡1 = mT, which, by integration

































Now, we can proceed to round T ¡ 1, and so on. In recursively computing @Vt=@k1, we
treat the thresholds k2;:::;kT¡1 as independent variables, and recognize that the choice


























and since m2 = k2 + ~ S2(k2), we have
@V1
@k1





Using the de¯nition of m2 and integration by parts, we can rewrite m2 as
m2 = k1 +
1
R2(k1)
(F(k1)~ S(k1) ¡ ~ F(k1) + ~ F(k2)):






(~ S(k1)F2(k1) + 2S(k1)( ~ F(k1) ¡ ~ F(k2))):






(F(k1)~ S(k1) + S(k1)( ~ F(k1) ¡ ~ F(k2)))(m2 ¡ k1):
{ 40 {Thus, the optimal ¯rst round threshold k1 satis¯es k1 = m2, completing the induction
argument. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5.2. For notational convenience, we drop the subscript T ¡ 1 from
lT¡1, vT¡1, ¼T¡1, °T¡1 and ¹T¡1. With l = N, v = N ¡1, and ¼;° 2 (0;1), the condition
for type xN¡1 to be indi®erent between accepting and rejecting type xN is:
xN¡1xN = xN¡1mT ¡ c: (A:4)
For any ° 2 (0;1), equation (A.4) determines at least one ¼ 2 (0;1). To see this, note that
mT = xN if ¼ = 0 (because only types xN¡1 and above participate in round T ¡1 and they
accept each other and exit) so that the left-hand-side of equation (A.4) is strictly larger
than the right-hand-side. On the other hand, mT > xN if ¼ = 1 (because types xN¡1 and
above have a positive probability of meeting and rejecting type xN in round T ¡1), so that
the left-hand-side is strictly smaller than the right-hand-side when c is su±ciently small.
Furthermore, equation (A.4) implies mT converges to xN as c converges to 0. Hence any
¼ that satis¯es the equation becomes arbitrarily small.
Next, consider the condition for type xN to be indi®erent between participating in
round T ¡ 1 and waiting for round T:
¡c + ¹N(xN)2 + ¹N¡1(1 ¡ °)xNxN¡1 = (¹N + ¹N¡1(1 ¡ °))(xNmT ¡ c): (A:5)
For any ¼, if ° = 1, then type xN strictly prefers waiting for round T, as the left-hand-side
of the above equation is strictly less than the right-hand-side. For c and ¼ su±ciently small,
if ° = 0, the left-hand-side of equation (A.5) is strictly greater than the right-hand-side.
To see this, note that ¹N converges to 0 as ¼ becomes close to 0, and so mT converges
to xN for any °. It follows that for su±ciently small c, at ° = 0, type xN strictly prefers
participating in round T ¡ 1.
By continuity of the solutions to equations (A.4) and (A.5), there is a pair ¼;° 2 (0;1)
that satis¯es the two equations for su±ciently small c. Further, we know from equation
(A.4) that mT converges to xN and ¼ converges to 0 as c becomes close to 0, so from
equation (A.5) we obtain that limc!0 ° = 1. Q.E.D.
{ 41 {Proof of Lemma 5.4. For notational convenience, we drop the subscript T ¡ 1 from
lT¡1, vT¡1, ¼T¡1, °T¡1, ¹T¡1 and gT¡1. For any j = 1;:::;N, let qj = ET¡1[x j x · xj]
and Qj = ET¡1[x j x ¸ xj]. Given l, ¼, v and °, we can write mT as:
mT = !ql¡1 + !lxl + !vxv + !Qv+1;
where the weights are given by RT! =
P
j>l gj, RT!v = gv¹l°, RT! = ¹l P
j<v gj, and






. We can rewrite mT > l as
RT!v(xv ¡ xl) + RT!(Qv¡1 ¡ xl) > RT!(xl ¡ ql+1):
The left-hand-side of the above inequality is increasing in °. It is also increasing in ¼
because ¹l increases with ¼. Finally, we can verify that when v increases by 1, the left-
hand-side changes by ¹lgv(xv¡xl)(1¡°)+¹lgv+1(xv+1¡xl)°, which is positive so long as
v < l ¡1. Thus, the left-hand-side increases with v. Since the right-hand-side is constant,
a necessary condition for mT > xl for some ¼, ° and v is that mT evaluated at ¼ = 1,
° = 1 and v = l¡1 is strictly greater than xl. Substitution and manipulation of the terms
in mT give the inequality stated in the lemma. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5.5. We ¯rst prove the proposition for T = 2. For each N, set
gT¡1 to fN in Lemma 5.4. We claim that for any threshold type x > a, the inequality
(5.1) cannot be satis¯ed for su±ciently large N, implying that x cannot be an equilibrium
participation threshold for any c su±ciently small. To see this, note that when x > a
the left-hand-side of the inequality in Lemma 5.4 converges to 0 as N becomes arbitrarily
large. The numerator of the right-hand-side becomes arbitrarily close to the di®erence











for any x0 2 (a;x). By assumption, FN(x0)=FN(x) is bounded away from 0 as N becomes
large, hence qN(x) is strictly smaller than x.
Next, suppose that the proposition is true for some T = T0. Then, for T = T0 + 1,
when N is su±ciently large and c is su±ciently small, in round 1 each type x faces a
{ 42 {continuation payo® that is arbitrarily close to xm2 ¡ c, where m2 the mean type among
all agents remaining in round 2. Hence, Lemma 5.4 applies and the inequality (5.1) is
necessary for any type xl to be an equilibrium participation threshold. We have already
shown that (5.1) cannot be satis¯ed for any xl > a when N is arbitrarily large. The
proposition then follows from induction. Q.E.D.
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